From Functionalism to Embodiment in Philosophy of Mind

Abstract

In recent decades, Functionalism has become a standard approach towards philosophy of mind and cognitive science, Functionalism is inspired by computer science and against prior theories about mind. Functionalism takes mind as a processor and body as a provider of raw data for this processor. Mind with the help of mental algorithms translates perceptional data to symbolic representations as concepts of objects and events. According to some philosophers, this leads to problems like the problem of meaning. In this paper, with an analytical approach, Embodiment is proposed as a solution to these problems. According to Embodied Mind, regarding the body as a mere machine is the root of all problems in Functionalism. Embodied mind is consisting of three pars: 1. Perception-Motor system which presents meaningful perception of objects and events to the mind. 2. Conceptualization system which unites information provided by perception-motor system. 3. Metaphors, processes in mind, which enable us to think and talk about everyday and mathematical concepts and meta-language. These are processes, mainly unconscious, in mind for understanding concepts. Embodied Mind rejects the idea of body as mere machine and mind as a brain processes. It also rejects symbolic representations as concepts. Concepts are simulators of objects and events, rooting in interaction between body and the world. Human as an Embodied Being exist in the world and interact with it and this is what makes sense of concepts in mind.

Keywords

• embodiment
• perception-motor system
• conceptual system
• metaphor
• symbolic representations