Blockchain and Supply-Chain Financing: An Evolutionary Game Approach with Guarantee Considerations

Abstract

Blockchain technology enables innovative financing models in supply-chain finance. This research constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model that includes core enterprises as employers, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as contractors, and banks as financial institutions, where they have been simulated for their impact on blockchain technology, especially on the strategic choices of supply-chain financing behavior and the system’s evolutionary path under core enterprises’ guarantee mechanism. The findings show the application of blockchain technology can effectively reduce the regulatory and review costs for financial institutions, thereby enhancing the efficiency of supply-chain financing. Particularly, blockchain technology provides a more reliable credit endorsement platform for SMEs in reducing their tendency to default. The guarantee mechanism of core enterprises is more effective with the support of blockchain technology, which helps to build more solid supply-chain financial cooperation relationships. The research contributes to the theoretical research on the integration of blockchain technology into supply-chain finance, especially for improving the operational efficiency of financial services. It also highlights the need for blockchain-backed guarantees from core enterprises in optimizing supply-chain financial services.

Keywords

• blockchain
• supply chain
• financing behavior
• evolutionary game
• evolutionary path
• guarantee mechanism