Peninsular Lessons for Atoll Warfare: The U.S. Marine Corps and the Development of Naval Gunfire Doctrine

Abstract

This paper utilizes the 1943 Battle of Tarawa as a lens to examine and evaluate the influence of the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign of 1915 upon U.S. Marine Corps inter-war development of naval gunfire support doctrine within amphibious warfare planning and the effectiveness of those plans in combat operations during Operation GALVANIC. The lessons of Gallipoli, specifically those that relate to the employment of naval gunfire, were key pieces of American pre-war planning, and yet, they underwent considerable revision once the war began. Tarawa served as a platform upon which inter-war ideas of amphibious operations were tested and their results adapted or modified in preparation for subsequent amphibious operations against Japanese holdings in the Pacific. American victory at Tarawa validated American amphibious warfare doctrine. Inter-war planning and critical evaluation of past amphibious assaults, laid the ground work for a coherent approach to offensive amphibious warfare, capable of adaptation and criticism. Significant attention will be paid to the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, published by the U.S. Marine Corps in 1934. Although failing to reference Gallipoli specifically, the Tentative Manual’s comprehensive definition of naval gunfire support builds upon numerous lessons extracted from the 1915 campaign.