L. M. Lopatin’s egology in the context of polemics with V. S. Soloviev

Abstract

This article deals with the philosophical controversy of L. Lopatin and Vl. Soloviev. According to Soloviev, Descartes mixed the pure subject of thought and the empirical subject, which created a “bastard”, a spiritual substance that coincides with a pure mind and with the individual being. In fact, says Soloviev, “I am always conscious of myself as the subject of mental states or emotions, and never as their substance. Thus, on the basis of existing reality there is no reason to ascribe to the subject of consciousness as such a diff erent reality than phenomenological”. Lopatin quite convincingly defends Descartes and criticises Soloviev’s “phenomenism”. Specifi cally, he notes that Soloviev’s dichotomy of the “empirical person” and “pure subject of thought” is not comprehensive. He suggests a third way of understanding Self as subjective consciousness that is “present in all stages of spiritual growth”. Important aspects of Lopatin’s egology are revealed in a dispute with E. N. Trubetskoy. Trubetskoy distinguishes “hypostasis” and “substance” as a kind of dynamic Self and static Self. This reasoning gives Lopatin the opportunity to once again formulate his concept of Self and show its closeness to Soloviev’s basic views. In contrast to the dispute with Soloviev, the dispute with Trubetskoy sets up a trinitarian context for egology, which extracts thinking about oneself out of the Cartesian “landscape” and opens up horizons for patristics. These discussions became the crossroads of the future paths of Russian personalism.

Keywords

• egology
• spiritual substance
• hypostasis
• person
• russian personalism
• эгология
• русский персонализм
• духовная субстанция
• ипостась
• личность