Sanction Avoidance and the Illegal Wildlife Trade: A Case Study of an Urban Wild Meat Supply Chain

Abstract

The unprecedented global scale of illegal wildlife trade poses threats to humans and ecosystems. Policies calling for increased enforcement to control illicit trade are rooted in the idea that more enforcement will result in greater deterrence, but as yet it is unclear how the illegal wildlife supply chain responds to enforcement actions. To evaluate the impact of formal or informal deterrence, it may be pertinent to consider strategies used by illicit networks to avoid sanction threats. Using an exploratory case study on urban wild meat trade (Republic of Congo), we describe some of the strategies used to avoid detection and consider how the concept of restrictive deterrence can be used to advance our understanding of the broader impacts of sanction threats on offender decision-making in illegal wildlife supply chains.

Keywords

• conservation
• environmental crime
• illicit trade
• restrictive deterrence
• wildlife trafficking
• wildlife crime