Investigating Effects of Monitoring Intensity on Relationship between Information asymmetry and Earnings Management

Abstract

Corporate governance as a regulatory and monitoring mechanism mans can adjust effects of information asymmetry and conflicts between interests of managers and stakeholders, and hence, it may reduce cost of earnings management. This empirical study gave rise to the evidence, measuring earnings management by assessing discretionary accruals and real earnings management, and then, the effect of monitoring intensity on the relationship between information asymmetry and earnings management was examined. The data were collected from 76 firms listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange with 836 observations, in the period 2002 to 2011, using regression model with panel data. The findings showed that monitoring intensity in the firms has significant negative impact on the relationship between information asymmetry and accrual earnings management. However, it was found that monitoring intensity has no significant effect on the relationship between information asymmetry and real earnings management.

Keywords

• monitoring intensity
• information asymmetry
• earnings management
• corporate governance