Using of asynchronous circuits to increase protection against side channels attacks

Abstract

The aim of this study is to analyze the use of asynchronous circuits to improve the security of information systems against side-channels attacks, which are means of obtaining unauthorized access to confidential data and performing unauthorized actions in the system. Side-channels attacks are fundamentally different as compared with a cryptographic analysis and an exploitation of software errors in their focus on the hardware of the system under attack. Integrated circuits unintentionally create electromagnetic signals during their operation and have a number of performance characteristics that can be investigated by an attacker and therefore become the sources of information leakage, i.e., side-channels. The security of modern information systems cannot be fully ensured without increasing resistance to such attacks. One of the methods to counter side-channel attacks is the use of asynchronous circuits, which main distinguishing feature is the refusal from the use of a global clock signal to synchronize individual elements of an integrated circuit in favour of local synchronization provided by the "handshake" mechanism. Integrated circuits designed using asynchronous circuitry have a number of unique benefits that make it possible to effectively resist side-channel attacks, such as timing attacks and attacks with using power consumption analysis. This paper presents a classification of side-channels attacks, describes asynchronous circuits and their properties that increase their resistance to certain types of side-channels attacks, and provides examples that clearly show the increase in the protection of information systems with the asynchronous circuits.

Keywords

• side-channel attacks, asynchronous circuits, integrated circuits, information systems security.