Patent Labeling and Cooperation in a Cloud Service Supply Chain

Abstract

In a cloud service supply chain composed of a cloud application developer (CAD) and two heterogeneous cloud service providers (CSPs), we study the cooperative supply decision making of the basic service unit. First, the optimization problem is modeled as a “patent labeling” game, where the labeling and supplying strategies of CAD are analyzed under different confidence indexes. Second, due to the immeasurability of the confidence index, the Shapley value contract is used to split profits at the cooperative stage, and the decision rule of CAD is presented. Finally, a cooperative subsidy mechanism is further proposed to achieve the Pareto improvement of all players when compared with the wholesale price contract. Model analysis shows that whether CAD is extremely optimistic or pessimistic in the negotiation with CSPs, it chooses to cooperate with the well-known CSP. Labeling is only selected when CAD is extremely pessimistic, and the labeling cost is low. When the confidence index fails to reach the extreme values, the supplier can make decisions referring to the hybrid contract on the basis of the Shapley value and cooperative subsidy mechanism.

Keywords

• Cloud service supply chain
• patent labeling
• coopetition game
• Shapley value
• subsidy