The behaviour of enterprises in relation to managers continuous training

Abstract

The present paper aims at analysing firms’ behaviour of managerial training from the viewpoint of information economics. Asymmetric information between organizations and their management may lead to moral hazard and adverse selection. The theoretical literature allows proposing an explicative model that considers the expectations of generating managerial capacities, the expectations of appropriating the benefits of these capacities, the strategic value of managers for firms and finally, the firms’ perception of the efforts thatinvesting in managerial training entail. The above-mentioned model analyses variables’ influences from a cost-benefit oriented viewpoint by systemizing them in order to the degree of proclivity that firms show. In this way, it aims at explaining the existing contradiction between firms’ discourse in favour of firms-provided training and the real behaviour that they usually adopt in fact.

Keywords

• Managers
• training
• appropriability
• moral hazard
• adverse selection