Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chains Considering the Offline Channel Preference and Service Level

Abstract

With the rapid development of e-commerce, the online channels encroaching on the offline sales market are becoming more serious, which will definitely harm the offline market. Moreover, there exists a certain percentage of consumers (mostly elderly people) who are not able to purchase online because they lack digital skills. Therefore, understanding the impact of the purchase channel preference and service level on pricing decisions is vital for the dual-channel supply chain management. Focusing on the channel preference and service level, we first develop an optimal pricing model containing centralized and decentralized decision-making for an online and offline retailer by deploying the Stackelberg game. We first develop a Stackleberg game to capture such a dual-channel supply chain with the offline channel preference and service level. Secondly, under centralized decision-making, we derive the optimal retail prices and obtain the optimal total profit. Thirdly, under decentralized decision-making, we obtain the optimal retail prices and optimal total profit as well. Moreover, extensive monotonicity properties when system parameters change are obtained. Relying on the theoretical results, firstly, we show that the improvement of the offline service level would lead to higher pricing of the commodities for both online and offline channels. From our numerical results, when the service level is improved, the offline and online optimal pricing increases by 47.5% and 31.1%, respectively, which may contradict the conventional belief that the improvement of one channel would harm another one. Secondly, we demonstrate that the benefit of improving the offline service level has a diminishing marginal effect. The numerical results show that when the current service level is low, the effectives of improving the service level is roughly five times that when the service level is high. This indicates that the investment in improving the offline service level should not be unlimited. Thirdly, we show that the pricing decision under centralized decision-making should be adopted with the existence of both the offline channel preference and offline service.

Keywords

• dual-channel supply chain
• Stackelberg game
• offline channel preference
• service level