Effects of congestion charging and subsidy policy on vehicle flow and revenue with user heterogeneity

Abstract

Traffic congestion is a major issue in urban traffic networks. Both congestion charging and subsidy policy can solve traffic congestion to some extent, but which one is better? Based on this, this paper constructs a typical transit network consisting of three travel tools in four common travel modes. Travelers' values of time affect their choice of transportation in the congestion network, thus a stochastic user equilibrium model is established by considering travelers' heterogenous values of time to evaluate the effects of different combinations of congestion charging and subsidy policies on vehicle flow and revenue. Numerical results indicate that the effectiveness of congestion charging and subsidy policy in alleviating traffic congestion depends on the object of charging or subsidizing. Congestion charging for private cars can reduce traffic flow and alleviate traffic congestion, but charging for ridesharing cars does not reduce traffic flow and may even cause traffic congestion. Subsidizing public buses does not reduce traffic flow, but it can ease congestion by coordinating traffic flow on both edges of the dual-modal transport. The combination of no subsidy for public buses and charging for both private cars and ridesharing cars can obtain the greatest revenue, but it does not alleviate traffic congestion. Although the combination of charging for private cars and subsidizing public buses does not bring the most benefits, it can reduce traffic flow, and its revenue is also considerable. This study can provide quantitative decision support for the government to ease traffic congestion and improve government revenue.

Keywords

• traffic congestion
• private car
• ridesharing car
• public bus
• transit subsidy
• value of time