DTR-SHIELD: Mutual Synchronization for Protecting against DoS Attacks on the SHIELD Protocol with AES-CTR Mode

Abstract

To enhance security in the semiconductor industry’s globalized production, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) proposed an authentication protocol under the Supply Chain Hardware Integrity for Electronics Defense (SHIELD) program. This protocol integrates a secure hardware root-of-trust, known as a dielet, into integrated circuits (ICs). The SHIELD protocol, combined with the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in counter mode, named CTR-SHIELD, targets try-and-check attacks. However, CTR-SHIELD is vulnerable to desynchronization attacks on its counter blocks. To counteract this, we introduce the DTR-SHIELD protocol, where DTR stands for double counters. DTR-SHIELD addresses the desynchronization issue by altering the counter incrementation process, which previously solely relied on truncated serial IDs. Our protocol adds a new AES encryption step and requires the dielet to transmit an additional 100 bits, ensuring more robust security through active server involvement and message verification.

Keywords

• supply chain security
• IC counterfeiting
• DARPA
• SHIELD
• dielet
• DoS attacks