Hegel’s Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom

Abstract

the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’.

Keywords

• German Idealism
• Kant
• Fichte
• Spirit
• postulate
• teleology
• mechanism
• naturalism
• self-legislation
• autonomy
• assumption
• faith
• Science of Logic
• Idea
• intentional stance
• transcendental philosophy
• voluntarism
• compatibilism
• objectivity
• action.