Ten Traps for Non-Representational Theory in Human Geography

Abstract

Non-Representational Theory (NRT) emphasizes the significance of routine experience in shaping human geography. In doing so, the theory largely eschews traditional approaches that have offered area-based, longitudinal, and synoptic formalisms for geographic inquiry. Instead, NRT prioritizes the roles of individualized and often dynamic lived geographies as they unfold in the moment. To date, NRT has drawn significant inspiration from the synergies that it shares with philosophy, critical geography, and self-referential ethnography. These activities have been tremendous in advancing NRT as a concept, but the theory’s strong ties to encounter and experience invariably call for practical exposition. Alas, applications of NRT to concrete examples at scales beyond small case studies often prove challenging, which we argue artificially constrains further development of the theory. In this paper, we examine some of the thorny problems that present in applying NRT in practical terms. Specifically, we identify ten traps that NRT can fall into when moving from theory to actuality. These traps include conundrums of small geographies, circularity in representation, cognitive traps, issues of mustering and grappling with detail, access issues, limitations with empiricism, problems of subjectivity, methodological challenges, thorny issues of translation, and the unwieldy nature of process dynamics. We briefly demonstrate a novel observational instrument that can sidestep some, but not all, of these traps.

Keywords

• non-representational theory
• human geography
• embodiment
• GIS