The “255 Committee” and the Procedure for Appointing EU Judges. The (Perhaps Unintended) Implications of the Valancius Judgment

Abstract

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(3), 846-850 | European Forum Highlight of 15 December 2024 | (Abstract) In its judgment of 29 July 2024, delivered in the Valančius case (Case C-119/23 Valančius ECLI:EU:C:2024:653), the Court of Justice ruled, for the first time, on the limits that EU law places on Member States in relation to the procedure for appointing judges and advocates general to the Court of Justice. The judgment provides an opportunity to reflect on the complex relationship between the different stages of the appointment procedure to rule out legitimate doubts as to its regularity and, consequently, as to the independence of the judges so appointed. Although not immediately obvious, the arguments and solutions adopted inappropriately entrust the “255 Committee” with a central role in ensuring the integrity and correctness of the overall procedure and its individual stages.

Keywords

• eu judges' appointment procedure
• “255 committee”
• judicial independence
• art. 19 teu
• art. 254 tfeu
• judicial review