Discussions of a Private Language: Wittgenstein and Rhees

Abstract

Already one year after the publication of Philosophical Investigations, the discussion about a private language had gathered pace. Since then, the debate has moved in various directions: Discussions about Wittgenstein’s method of doing philosophy; about how to read him; about variations of ‘private’ language users; about private experiences, (private) ostensive definitions, behaviourism, the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ etc. I have tried to cover those points, which I think crucial for the understanding of a ‘private’ language: the rule-fixing problem, the confusion of giving and using a sample, private charts, knowledge, memory, and justification. I have thereby made extensive use of remarks by Wittgenstein and Rush Rhees, particularly Wittgenstein’s manuscripts, the Whewell Court lectures 1938-41, and unpublished material by Rhees. The reason for this is that I could not have put it in any better words, and that for me these remarks speak for themselves. I wish that others will make a ‘similar’ experience.

Keywords

• Giving and using a sample. Justification. Memory. Private charts. Robinson. The rule-fixing problem. Wallpaper pattern. ‘Subjective’ knowledge