Interrogating Safeguards Under the Mental Health Act in Ontario: Towards a Postmodernist Relational Understanding of Disability

Abstract

Employing critical discourse analysis (CDA), this paper examines how medicalized concepts of mental illness and paternalistic views are framed and used in the legal case, Thompson and Empowerment Council v. Ontario (2013). The paper argues that the case utilizes a pathologized notion of mental illness to justify and defend the legality of involuntary treatment, specifically, the community treatment orders (CTOs) under Ontario’s Mental Health Act (MHA). This paper shows how the Thompson case relies on medical reductionism and binary notions of capacity versus incapacity while failing to consider intersecting factors and contextual and social determinants of psychosocial disability. Following this, I suggest that a postmodernist relational theory of disability could change the legal discourses about the MHA. Challenging the medicalized view of mental illness through the relational approach to psychosocial disability could have strengthened the plaintiffs’ case and prompted legal reforms for better safeguards under the MHA. In doing so, this paper offers a basis and future direction for legal reforms that can lead to legal mandates for improved social and healthcare services to enhance the autonomy of individuals subjected to CTOs.

Keywords

• Mental Health Act (MHA)
• CTOs
• Mental Health
• Psychosocial disability
• Postmodernist model of disability
• Human Rights