The Monostatic Radar and Jammer Games Based on Signal-to-Jamming-Plus-Noise Ratio

Abstract

In modern electronic warfare, both the radar and the jammer are capable of changing their waveforms to achieve better performance. The conflict relationship between the radar and jammer can be modeled as a non-cooperative game. In this paper, the optimal strategies of a monostatic radar and a jammer are investigated in terms of both Stackelberg game and symmetric game. Instead of using the widely used mutual information as the utility function, signal-to-jamming-plus-noise ratio (SJNR) is used in formulating the utility functions which is directly related to the target detection performance. In Stackelberg game, the Stackelberg equilibria solutions are derived when the leader is the radar and the jammer, respectively. In symmetric game, the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) is investigated and the corresponding strategies are obtained when Nash equilibrium exists. If Nash equilibrium does not exist, the Stackelberg equilibria strategies are still useful as they can be regarded as the robust strategies which could optimize the worst case performance. The relationship between the mutual information utility function and the proposed SJNR utility function is investigated as well. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the radar and jammer strategies. The investigation in this paper can provide optimal waveform solutions for the monostatic radar and the jammer in the confrontation scenario.

Keywords

• Equilibrium
• Stackelberg game
• symmetric game
• signal-to-jamming-plus-noise ratio~(SJNR)