A Stackelberg-Game Approach for Disaster-Recovery Communications Utilizing Cooperative D2D

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate disaster-recovery communications utilizing two-cell cooperative D2D communications. Specifically, one cell is in a healthy area, while the other is in a disaster area. A user equipment (UE) in the healthy area aims to assist a UE in the disaster area to recover wireless information transfer via an energy harvesting relay. In the healthy area, the cellular base station (BS) shares the spectrum with the UE, however, both of them may belong to different service providers. Thus, the UE pays an amount of price as incentive to the BS as part of two processes: energy trading and interference pricing. We formulate these two processes as two Stackelberg games, where their equilibrium is derived as closed-form solutions. The results help providing a sustainable framework for disaster recovery when the involving parties juggle between energy trading, interference compromise, and payment incentives in establishing communications during the recovery process.

Keywords

• D2D communications
• disaster-recovery communications
• RF energy harvesting
• energy trading
• interference pricing
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