Cultural rice fields in the wave of climate change: a multilateral evolutionary game framework for adaptive management of agricultural heritage systems

Abstract

Abstract Agricultural Heritage Systems (AHS) are pivotal in preserving rich agricultural production experience and traditional culture, as well as in maintaining biodiversity and promoting sustainable development in agriculture and rural economies. However, climate change poses significant threats to these systems, such as ecological degradation, biodiversity loss, and shifts in agricultural production patterns. This study, grounded in theories of information asymmetry and bounded rationality, constructs evolutionary game models for adaptive management of AHS under market mechanisms and government guidance. By employing stability analysis and numerical simulation with Delay Differential Equations (DDE) that consider historical delays, and through sensitivity analysis, this research delves into the strategic evolutionary outcomes of stakeholders under various scenarios. It aims to provide theoretical insights and policy recommendations for the dynamic protection and adaptive management of AHS in the face of climate change. The findings indicate that the public goods nature of AHS, alongside externalities and information asymmetry, leads to market failure. Sole reliance on autonomous actions by farmers and meteorological departments is insufficient for optimal resource allocation and effective protection. Government intervention, through regulatory and incentive measures, can effectively mitigate market failures and steer adaptive management of AHS towards efficiency and sustainability. Moreover, the study identifies key factors for adaptive management, such as enhancing stakeholders’ initial willingness to participate, reducing the costs of adapting to climate change, optimizing cooperative benefit distribution mechanisms, and increasing the profitability of resource cooperation. Sensitivity analysis of government subsidies and penalty mechanisms further reveals the complex and critical role these policy tools play in fostering stakeholder engagement. Based on these findings, the study recommends enhancing initial participation willingness, controlling transformation costs to alleviate economic burdens, optimizing benefit distribution mechanisms to boost cooperative resource profitability, and establishing dynamic subsidy and penalty mechanisms for optimal resource allocation. The theoretical and practical contributions of this research lie in applying theories of information asymmetry and bounded rationality to the adaptive management of AHS under climate change, enriching the theoretical framework in this field, and providing scientific decision-making support for policymakers. By demonstrating an effective path for AHS protection through combined government and market mechanisms in the context of global climate change, this research holds significant theoretical and practical implications for enhancing the efficiency of adaptive management of AHS, protecting, and inheriting valuable agricultural cultural heritage.

Keywords

• Agricultural heritage systems
• Adaptive management
• Climate change
• Evolutionary game theory
• Delay differential equations (DDE)