Cooperative coordination between port microgrid and berthed ships with emission limitation and peak awareness

Abstract

Due to growing concerns on energy efficiency and environmental issues, most ports are increasingly being equipped with cold ironing (CI) facilities, i.e., shoreside power supply facilities, which provide energy to ships at berth from the shoreside grid. The emergence of CI has coupled the energy connection between port microgrid and berthed ships. However, simply treating CI demands from berthed ships as passive loads, without considering the energy coordination, will increase the operational burden of the port. In this paper, an incentive-based cooperative coordination framework between port microgrid and berthed ships is proposed, where the flexibility of CI power is used as a demand response tool. With the aim of minimizing the net cost comprising energy cost and potential demand charge, the port will differentially coordinate berthed ships to adjust their CI demand requests, to alleviate peak burden. The social cost minimization as well as net cost reduction of each participant will be achieved in this cooperative coordination framework. Asymmetric Nash bargaining is adopted to design incentive mechanism, where a novel index, termed as contribution rate is proposed to evaluate the participants’ contributions to the coordination. Distributed solution is proposed to solve the optimization problem, to guarantee the autonomy and information privacy of participants. Simulation results demonstrate the validity of the proposed method in achieving benefits for both port and berthed ships.

Keywords

• Bargaining game
• Berthed ships
• Cold ironing
• Cooperative coordination
• Demand response
• Port microgrid