Analysis of a certain polycyclic-group-based cryptosystem

Abstract

We investigate security properties of the Anshel–Anshel–Goldfeld commutator key-establishment protocol [Math. Res. Lett. 6 (1999), 287–291] used with certain polycyclic groups described by Eick and Kahrobaei [http://arxiv.org/abs/math.GR/0411077]. We show that despite low success of the length based attack shown by Garber, Kahrobaei and Lam [J. Math. Crypt. 9 (2015), 33–43] the protocol can be broken by a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm.

Keywords

• cryptography
• commutator-key establishment
• conjugacy problem
• polycyclic groups
• metabelian groups
• 94a60
• 68w30