Campus microgrid protection: a unified approach against cyberattacks

Abstract

Read online

When False Data Injection (FDI) attacks inject false data into the controllers of a microgrid, it can lead the controllers to make decisions based on inaccurate information, ultimately resulting in system collapse. This study presents a novel approach to dynamically adjust output voltage in Campus Microgrids (CMG). Initially, we use feedback linearization techniques to address the inherent nonlinear complexities in Distributed Generation (DG) dynamics. Moreover, during voltage regulation, controllers and sensors may be susceptible to FDI attacks. To address this, an elastic follower observer is introduced to mitigate the impact of false information injection attacks on voltage coordination, thus ensuring the robustness and stability of the system. Notably, our method reduces dependence on global information and fault boundaries within the communication network, thereby enhancing system elasticity and efficiency. In conclusion, through comprehensive simulation experiments, we evaluate the effectiveness and performance of our proposed strategy. The simulation results validate the success of our approach in voltage regulation and its efficiency in fault management. These findings bear significant implications for the advancement of voltage regulation strategies in distributed generation systems.

Keywords

• voltage regulation control
• fully distributed control
• cyberattacks
• distributed generation (DG)
• false data injection (FDI)