Cooperation for trans-regional electricity trading from the perspective of carbon quota: A cooperative game approach

Abstract

Trans-regional electricity trading is a meaningful way to optimize resource allocation and achieve carbon peak and carbon neutrality goals. In this paper, we construct the trans-regional electricity trading cooperative game models considering the impact of local microgrid integration. Based on the cooperative game theory with coalition and graph structures, the optimal mode of trans-regional electricity cooperation and the impact of different carbon quota systems on cooperation profits are studied. The profits obtained through the trans-regional electricity trading are reasonably distributed by the profit distribution scheme based on the Owen graph value. The theoretical and numerical simulation results demonstrate that the local microgrid and the bulk power grid form a priori union, and then participate in the trans-regional electricity trading can obtain more profits. In addition, when the low-carbon policy on the demand side of electricity becomes more relaxed, the implementation of a carbon quota shared responsibility between producers and consumers will be more effective than producer responsibility. Compared with the Myerson value, the profit distribution scheme based on the Owen graph value is more suitable for distributing the profits obtained through trans-regional electricity trading.

Keywords

• C71
• Q40