Multiplayer game dynamics and their applications into simplicial complexes with memory effect

Abstract

We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of the multiplayer, snowdrift-like game based on memory effects, in which cooperators and defectors interact with another type of player named as exiter. To avoid being exploited by defectors, the conservative exiters tend to drop out of a game and merely share quite minor returns. Results on the well-mixed populations indicate that the existence of exiters is less conducive to cooperation. Whereas, in networks with simplicial complexes, the memory effect can effectively inhibit evolution of defection and promote cooperation. Other outcomes with respect to the evolution of exiters and defectors, including the co-existence of all three types of players in the network and the favor of exiter, can be obtained by tuning the payoff to exit and the proportion of 1-simplices and 2-simplices. The current results provide insight into how mutual cooperation emerges in real networked populations, influenced by the memory-based exit options.

Keywords

• evolutionary game theory
• simplicial complexes
• memory effect