Collaborative strategies of multiple stakeholders in green innovation of megaprojects based on a three-group evolutionary game

Abstract

Implementing green innovation in megaprojects is an effective way to reduce energy consumption, environmental pollution and eliminate environmental externalities. In order to consider the interactive effects of multiple stakeholders, we constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model including the government, the public, and construction enterprises. And investigated the effects of the initial strategy and various parameter adjustments on the players' choices through simulation. In comparison to previous research, we discover that government penalties and subsidies and the degree of public participation all affect the motivation of construction enterprises to execute green innovation. Government behavior and public participation are also interacting, government incentives can encourage public participation on the one hand, while public participation can inhibit negative government regulatory behavior, and environmental contamination by construction enterprises, effectively promoting green innovation in megaprojects on the other. Finally, we attempt to provide solutions for incentivizing green innovation in megaprojects from a synergistic perspective.

Keywords

• Megaprojects
• Evolutionary game
• Green innovations
• Government behavior
• Public participation