Research on the Path of Policy Financing Guarantee to Promote SMEs’ Green Technology Innovation

Abstract

In the process of policy financing guaranteeing help to SMEs to make innovations in green technologies, multiple parties continue to play strategic games for their interests. Evolutionary game theory is a practical tool for analyzing multi-agent strategies, which can help us to explore how policy financing guarantees help to SMEs to achieve effective credit enhancement. This paper constructs a four-party evolutionary game model among SMEs, banks, guarantee agencies, and the government, and obtains four evolutionary stable strategies by analyzing various players’ replicator dynamics. In addition, we carry out numerical simulations on the key parameters affecting the stability of the game system. The findings suggest that keeping the fixed risk-ratio between guarantee agencies and banks constant reduces the government’s financial burden and strengthens the re-guarantee system’s construction at the initial stage of SME financing, which can indirectly increase the enthusiasm for cooperation between banks and guarantee agencies. The interest subsidy policy is more effective in promoting SMEs’ compliance and bank–guarantee cooperation in the short term. Meanwhile, the government should increase the supervision of defaulting SMEs and cooperate with financial institutions to improve the credit system for SMEs.

Keywords

• policy financing guarantee
• SMEs
• green technology innovation
• credit enhancement