Study on the evolution of collaborative innovation in marine economy considering the participation of financial institutions and two types of cooperation

Abstract

In the realm of significant technological research and innovation within the marine economy, enterprises and academic research institutions often grapple with a lack of innovation motivation due to financial constraints. This paper introduces the factor of ''capital constraints'' into the marine innovation chain, establishing a technological innovation chain within the marine economy. Utilizing a three-party evolutionary game model, the study delves into the strategy selection and evolution of financial institutions, marine enterprises, and academic research institutions. In contrast to previous studies, this paper categorizes technological innovation cooperation into two types: ''cooperative tackling type'' and ''market-oriented promotion type.'' Additionally, it posits that collaboration between academic research institutions and marine enterprises establishes an implicit guarantee relationship, facilitating access to higher loan amounts for both parties. The research reveals that the behavior of governments and marine enterprises is influenced by the initial willingness of participants. Higher basic benefits of cooperation and innovation between academic research institutions and marine enterprises lead to a quicker attainment of an evolutionary stable state. Moreover, in collaborations between marine enterprises and research institutions, an excessively high proportion of funds occupied by marine enterprises proves disadvantageous. The paper suggests that pure market-oriented promotion innovation cooperation could serve as a supplementary approach to traditional cooperation and innovation. Finally, numerical examples are presented to elucidate the outcomes of the theoretical model, accompanied by policy suggestions.

Keywords

• Major marine engineering
• Implicit guarantee
• Evolutionary game
• Collaborative innovation