Community Management of Groundwater under a Private Property Regime: An Example of Institutional Local Adaptation to Overexploitation Problems in the Copiapó Aquifer, Chile

Abstract

The governance model established in Chilean water law delegates responsibility for groundwater management to private water rights owners. The Copiapó aquifer in the Atacama Region, Chile, has problems of overexploitation resulting from intensive use of the resource. This is explained by the limited information on the water availability in the aquifer and the existence of legally granted water rights whose flows exceed the rate of natural recharge. In this context, water users formed Chile’s first groundwater users’ community in the Copiapó basin for the collective administration of the aquifer. Although this organization is regulated by Chilean water law, the way in which its members participate in decision-making processes and some self-management mechanisms that they have implemented are local institutional arrangements that go beyond the rules established in the Water Code, showing this organization to be an empirical case of institutional adaptation to the overdepletion of an aquifer. The local institutional arrangements include incorporating environmental protection objectives for aquifers and wetlands, establishing an institutional arrangement that guarantees the participation in the decision-making processes of different water uses and users, developing an internal management model that promotes temporary transfers of partial volumes of a water right and carrying out studies to improve water management.

Keywords

• groundwater overexploitation
• institutional arrangements
• groundwater management
• water markets