Українознавство (Jan 2020)
Military Aggression of the Russian Federation: the 2008 War in Georgia; Annexation of Crimea and Military Actions in Donbas in 2014; “Suwalki Gap”
Abstract
This article uses the method of comparative analysis to investigate the tactics of military and political aggression of the Russian Federation in the territories of the former USSR. This tactic involves the use of disruptive geopolitical technologies of influence and direct military intervention. It is determined that the government and special services of the USSR have been laying foundations of regional separatism since at least 1990. It is on the basis of these actions that conflicts have unfolded in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Donbas. The military tactics of the Russian Federation are deployed under the same scenario and include a series of measures that can be divided into four stages: creation of a separatist environment, deployment of a conflict under the disguise of civil war, military operation of the Russian Armed Forces, further freezing of the conflict. At the stage of direct military intervention, the Russian Federation is unable to sustain full-scale conflicts and is only capable of a fleeting war in a foreign territory against a country with low defense capabilities and further transition to “freezing” the conflict. In a comparative analysis, the fightings in Georgia in August–December 2008 and in Donbas on August 24–29, 2014 look very similar. In both wars, Russian aggression occurred after the activation of the separatist armed forces. Russia used the same units of ground forces, paratroopers, and intelligence services. Obviously, the same troops, especially landing parties, are to be used in a hypothetical conflict in the Baltic region. The fundamental difference lies only in the scale of aggression, which allowed the Kremlin propaganda to prove its non-interference in the events in Donbas. The Black Sea Fleet’s stay in Crimea became a fatal determinant of both the aggression against Georgia in 2008 and the events of 2014. The seizure of Crimea traces the same successive stages of the conflict escalation, except for the freezing tactic substituted by the actual unarmed surrender of the Ukrainian side. The military aggression of the Russian Federation in the Baltic region is possible only with the inaction of NATO forces, which is unlikely but not excluded, given the “soft” policy of the West against the Russian Federation.
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