Reprezentační schopnost soudu: Wittgensteinova odpověď a Russellovu mnohorelační teorii souzení

Abstract

The goal of the article is to offer a new interpretation of Wittgenstein’s famous commentaries on Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, according to which judging is a multiple relationship of a judging subject to particular judged elements. In 1913, Wittgenstein repeatedly tried to convince Russell that the possibility of judging nonsense was not ruled out in his theory, and this accusation was most often seen as a reference to the inability of Russell’s multiple relation theory to ensure the unity of the judgment. In the present article, however, I will try to show that Wittgenstein’s words can be grasped in another way, namely that the central theme becomes the (in)ability of the multiple relation theory to explain the basic feature of the judgment, i.e. its representational ability.

Keywords

• bertrand russell
• early wittgenstein
• multiple relation theory of judgment
• judging
• judgement
• theory of knowledge