The Pattern of judges’ selection of the Constitutional Court in the States of Iraq and Turkey

Abstract

The function of protection institution of the constitutional in every legal system is always protecting the aspirations of the nation and fundamental rights. This institution can accelerate or even weaken the movement of people in countries that are transitioning to democracy. Public trust in these institutions is closely linked to their independence. The effective factor of this independence is the appointment of the judges of the courts. As for the various systems of selection of judges, it is possible to determine the extent and manner of the interference of other organizations in this regard. Iraq and Turkey, which have undergone democratic changes in recent years, have experienced varying degrees of independence and, consequently, legitimacy by following different patterns of selection of constitutional judges. With the implementation of administrative model, the Iraqi state has strongly influenced the executive branch, and the issuance of unilateral sentences for the benefit of the ruling party can prove this hypothesis. However, Turkey, deviating from the executive model and accepting a multi-domain pattern, has increased the participation of civil society organizations and other branches in the selection of court judges and increased the legitimacy of the court.

Keywords

• constitutional court independence
• selection of constitutional judges
• administrative model
• multi-domain pattern
• turkey
• iraq