Akkirmânî’s Occasionalist Approach to the Neuroscientific Research on the Human Will

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the problem of human freedom and responsibility in light of current neuroscientific research, particularly focusing on Libet-style experiments. Beginning with a review of significant experiments on the nature of human will, starting with Libet’s influential series from the 1980s, I survey various interpretations of these experiments including those that pose challenges to concepts of human freedom and responsibility. Subsequently, I introduce the perspective of Mehmed Akkirmânî (d. 1760), an Ottoman scholar who advocates for a libertarian view of human freedom within an occasionalist framework and constructs sophisticated arguments against theological determinism. Akkirmânî’s analysis of human will delineates different aspects such as inclinations, intentions, and decisions, positing that humans possess freedom solely in their conscious decisions, thereby suggesting a limited scope of free will. I argue that Akkirmânî’s views are remarkably consonant with contemporary scientific findings and align with some libertarian positions. His occasionalist perspective offers an alternative model to contemporary naturalist physicalism in elucidating the connection between mental and neurophysical states.

Keywords

• Mehmed Akkirmânî
• Benjamin Libet
• Libet-style experiments
• human will
• determinism
• moral responsibility