Incentive strategy of safe and intelligent production in assembled steel plants from the perspective of evolutionary game

Abstract

Abstract Due to the numerous cross-operations and poor information communication, it is easy to cause production safety accidents in traditional assembled steel plants. The transformation and upgrading of smart production in the assembly steel plants is helpful to improve the efficiency of safety management. In order to effectively reduce the safety risks in the production of assembled steel components, this paper integrates policy incentives and safety supervision, constructs an evolutionary game model between the government and assembled steel producers, and analyzes the strategic evolution rules and stability conditions of stakeholders through the replication dynamics equation. Moreover, based on the empirical simulation of the Fuzhou X Steel Structure Plant project, the effectiveness of the evolutionary model incentive strategy setting is verified. The results show that whether an assembled steel plants adopt a smart management strategy or not is influenced by the government's incentive subsidy mechanism, penalty mechanism, the benefits and costs generated by traditional/ smart management, the probability and loss of safety accidents and other factors. The conclusion is important for upgrading the safety management mode, improving the safety production efficiency and constructing the safety supervision system of the assembled steel smart plant.