Research on Safety Regulation of Chemical Enterprise under Third-Party Mechanism: An Evolutionary Approach

Abstract

In recent years, China’s chemical industry has incurred frequent safety accidents which seriously impact the social environment and public safety. Traditional approaches have reached a bottleneck due to a lack of relevant professionals in the government regulation of chemical enterprise safety production. Thus, a new safety regulation mechanism should be conducted. In this paper, we constructed an evolutionary game model of chemical industry safety regulation based on limited rationality, and the influence of main parameters on the equilibrium evolution process is studied by system dynamics simulation. The results show that government regulation authorities play a leading role in the process of chemical industry safety regulation and increasing punishment will help to achieve an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). What is more, the feasibility and effectiveness of the third-party regulation service mechanism are verified, and the market access threshold of third-party regulation service needs to be improved to stop the occurrence of rent-seeking activities in the regulatory process. In summary, the introduction of third-party regulation service entities to the chemical industry safety regulation process has far-reaching implications for promoting the healthy development of China’s chemical industry.

Keywords

• chemical enterprise safety regulation
• third-party regulation service
• evolutionary game
• system dynamics