Forma věty a jednota pojmu. K systematickému kontextu teorie predikace a spekulativní věty v předmluvě k Fenomenologii ducha

Abstract

One of the most difficult parts of Hegel’s logic is his doctrine of the speculative sentence. Its roots can be found already in the preface to the Phenomenology of Mind, namely in the passage considered as the most challenging in the entire preface. The aim of the article is to analyse Hegel’s assertions in the pertinent systematic context. We affirm that this systematic context is Hegel’s confrontation with Kant’s transcendental logic. Hegel’s aim is, firstly, to confirm the Kantian critic of the rationalist metaphysics and, subsequently, to surmount it in order to put forward a new form of metaphysics. This metaphysics would be determined by the concept of mind as the identity of substance and subject and can be formulated only by means of the speculative sentence.