MARKET CONDUCT IN THE BALI CATTLE TRADING

Abstract

The structure of the cattle market in Indonesia faces an unfair market mechanism causing the behavior of the bali cattle market to be controlled by ologopsonists. This study uses 200 farmers and 14 inter-island traders and 5 brokers to reveal the behavior of the Bali cattle market in East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) Province. The analysis of the institutional approach includes product flow and the role of marketing agency services, the functional approach includes the exchange function and the physical function. The results of the study found that the pricing mechanism for Bali cattle is controlled by buyers through traders and through village intermediaries/brokers who are few in number and the purpose of selling cattle is to wait for economic pressures from the farmer's household. Institutionally, the flow of bali cattle products passes through two marketing channels, namely direct channels to interinsuer traders and indirect channels. Collusion between interinsuer traders and business coordination is detrimental to the market in cattle trading. The buyers of cattle take advantage of the pressure situation of the economic needs of the farmer's household to pressure the farmers to sell their cattle at low prices. The large number of breeders in selling their cattle to interincellular traders who are few in number causes the breeders (sellers) to only act as price takers, while traders act as price makers. Institutionally and functionally the market has not been running well. The government needs to make efforts to protect cattle farmers through an efficient market mechanism.

Keywords

• market conduct
• oligopsony
• farmers
• brokers
• intercellular traders