Constitutionalising the Сoncept of Militant Democracy

Abstract

The principles of militant democracy as a manifestation of the instinct of self-preservation of democratic systems are considered. The argumentation of supporters and critics of militant democracy regarding the use of restrictive measures to save democratic institutions is analysed. Two main types of instruments of militant democracy are distinguished: 1) creation of obstacles to the coming to power of alleged enemies of democracy using the election mechanism (prohibition of political parties); 2) restriction of opportunities for abuse of state power. A number of measures to prevent the degeneration of militant democracy into authoritarianism are given, in particular, fixing the monopoly on banning parties to a body protected from political pressure. Two ways of implementing the provisions of militant democracy are defined and analysed: through the constitution and relevant legislation, or only in legislative acts. Using the example of Germany, the peculiarities of the first method, which is characteristic of countries with negative historical experience of destroying democratic institutions by formally legal methods, are analysed. The second method, which is used by the states which do not want to compromise the ideal model of liberal democracy, is illustrated by the analysis of Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom and the USA. It is noted that the Constitution of Ukraine contains a number of provisions of militant democracy, in particular, the complicated procedure for amending the fundamental articles and the grounds for banning political parties. The latter were applied to pro-Russian parties too late - after the beginning of the Russian aggression in 2014, but their relevance will grow with the prolongation of the war and deterioration of the socio-economic situation of citizens.

Keywords

• militant democracy
• democracy
• political party
• constitution
• election
• extremism
• human rights
• court
• ideology