Explaining Managerial Incentives for Earnings Manipulation Using Cumulative Prospect Theory (Case Study: Companies Listed in Tehran Stock Exchange)

Abstract

Prospect theory explains how individuals’ feelings and preferences influence their decision-making. The purpose of this research was to investigate earnings manipulation incentives within companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange using fourfold pattern of risk attitudes provided by the cumulative prospect theory. The period of this research was 6 years, from 2013 to 2018 and included 695 observations. Hypothesis testing using logistic regression, with the average competitor performance within the industry as the reference point, revealed a significant positive (vs. negative) effect of management’s loss (vs. gain) estimates relative to the reference point on earnings manipulation. In other words, when management’s estimate of the likelihood of loss relative to the reference point is high (vs. low), the likelihood of earnings manipulation increases (vs. decreases). Furthermore, when management’s estimate of the likelihood of gain relative to the reference point is low (vs. high), the likelihood of earnings manipulation increases (vs. decreases). The findings of research also provided evidence for loss-aversion among managers. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the cumulative prospect theory can be utilized to explain managerial incentives for earnings manipulation.

Keywords

• prospect theory
• cumulative prospect theory
• earnings manipulation
• reference point
• loss-aversion