Sociologies (Jan 2012)
La sociologie peut-elle ignorer la phylogenèse de l'esprit ?
Abstract
This article discusses the arguments that Albert Ogien and Louis Quéré direct against social naturalism, i.e. the metatheoretical project of integrating the empirical evidence and theoretical considerations from evolutionary biology and the cognitive sciences to the social sciences. Albert Ogien defends a de facto and a de jure irreducibility of social to cognitive properties. It is objected that the integrative research in present day cognitive science that is relevant to the de facto discussion fails to be taken into account. De jure irreducibility, on the other hand, introduces a dualism in the social sciences that is difficult to justify. The distinction between the epistemic and the cognitive realms is further presented as the ground of a de jure irreducibility; Albert Ogien, however, fails to conclusively establish that social coordination is a necessary precondition of sensitivity to epistemic norms. Louis Quéré, on his part, objects that cognitive science makes an ambiguous use of the concept of concept; a "rich" concept, which cognitive science tends to ignore, involving the understanding of truth, correction, etc., is of crucial relevance to sociology. It is responded that a meager concept of concept (unaccompanied by the analysis of what is epistemically distinctive of concept hood) is not only applied to characterize non-propositional thinking in animals; meager concepts are also part of humans' associative and evaluative repertoire, concerning, inter alia, their own capacities, and the trustworthiness of their partners.
