Nature Communications (Dec 2020)
The biosecurity benefits of genetic engineering attribution
- Gregory Lewis,
- Jacob L. Jordan,
- David A. Relman,
- Gregory D. Koblentz,
- Jade Leung,
- Allan Dafoe,
- Cassidy Nelson,
- Gerald L. Epstein,
- Rebecca Katz,
- Michael Montague,
- Ethan C. Alley,
- Claire Marie Filone,
- Stephen Luby,
- George M. Church,
- Piers Millett,
- Kevin M. Esvelt,
- Elizabeth E. Cameron,
- Thomas V. Inglesby
Affiliations
- Gregory Lewis
- Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University
- Jacob L. Jordan
- Nuclear Threat Initiative
- David A. Relman
- Department of Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine
- Gregory D. Koblentz
- Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University
- Jade Leung
- Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University
- Allan Dafoe
- Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University
- Cassidy Nelson
- Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University
- Gerald L. Epstein
- Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University
- Rebecca Katz
- Center for Global Health Science and Security, Georgetown University
- Michael Montague
- Center for Health Security, Johns Hopkins University
- Ethan C. Alley
- Alt. Technology Labs, Inc.
- Claire Marie Filone
- The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
- Stephen Luby
- Department of Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine
- George M. Church
- Alt. Technology Labs, Inc.
- Piers Millett
- Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University
- Kevin M. Esvelt
- Alt. Technology Labs, Inc.
- Elizabeth E. Cameron
- Nuclear Threat Initiative
- Thomas V. Inglesby
- Center for Health Security, Johns Hopkins University
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19149-2
- Journal volume & issue
-
Vol. 11,
no. 1
pp. 1 – 4
Abstract
A key security challenge with biosecurity threats is determining the responsible actor. In this Perspective, the authors review recent developments in using genetic sequence to assign a lab-of-origin and the potential protection it provides against misuse of synthetic biology.
