The Strategy Selection in Financial Fraud and Audit Supervision: A Study Based on a Three-Party Evolutionary Game Model

Abstract

In recent years, financial fraud of listed internet companies has emerged one after another. Under the strategic goal of full audit coverage, the problems caused by audit failure have attracted more and more attention in China. We use the bounded rationality theory to analyze the strategy selections of listed internet companies, accounting firms, and audit regulators, and put forward three hypotheses: the hypothesis of participants, the hypothesis of strategy selections, and the hypothesis of model parameters. Next, the three-party evolutionary game model is constructed, and only one stable equilibrium point is found. In numerical simulation analyses, we discuss the strategy selections of the three parties under the impact of different model parameters. The research framework of this paper enriches the existing research on financial fraud and audit supervision and deepens the evolutionary mechanism of three-party strategy selections.

Keywords

• financial fraud
• audit supervision
• three-party evolutionary game model
• strategy selection