Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Low-Carbon Technology Innovation With Multi-Agent Participation

Abstract

Low-carbon technology innovation (LCTI) is an effective way to solve the problem of global climate change and reduce carbon emissions. Therefore, using evolutionary game theory, this research constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of LCTI involving the government, enterprises, and consumers. Moreover, this research investigates the strategic choices of the three parties in the process of LCTI, discusses the stability of the equilibrium point. In particular, it analyzes the influence of different factors on the strategic choices of the three parties through numerical simulation. The results indicate that, 1) the government, enterprises, and consumers are affected to different degrees by each other’s initial willingness; 2) the intensity of government regulation, innovation subsidies, and carbon tax rates have different effects on enterprises and consumers; 3) consumers are more sensitive to innovation subsidies. These results could provide references for enterprises to promote the development of LCTI.

Keywords

• Tripartite evolutionary game
• low-carbon technology innovation
• simulation analysis