BMC Public Health (May 2023)

COVID-19 surveillance in Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda: strengths, weaknesses and key Lessons

  • Olufunmilayo Ibitola Fawole,
  • Segun Bello,
  • Ayo Stephen Adebowale,
  • Eniola Adetola Bamgboye,
  • Mobolaji Modinat Salawu,
  • Rotimi Felix Afolabi,
  • Magbagbeola David Dairo,
  • Alice Namale,
  • Suzanne Kiwanuka,
  • Fred Monje,
  • Noel Namuhani,
  • Steven Kabwama,
  • Susan Kizito,
  • Rawlance Ndejjo,
  • Ibrahima Seck,
  • Issakha Diallo,
  • Mamadou Makhtar,
  • Mbacke Leye,
  • Youssou Ndiaye,
  • Manel Fall,
  • Oumar Bassoum,
  • Mala Ali Mapatano,
  • Marc Bosonkie,
  • Landry Egbende,
  • Siobhan Lazenby,
  • William Wang,
  • Anne Liu,
  • Rebecca Bartlein,
  • William Sambisa,
  • Rhoda Wanyenze

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-023-15708-6
Journal volume & issue
Vol. 23, no. 1
pp. 1 – 15

Abstract

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Abstract Introduction As part of efforts to rapidly identify and care for individuals with COVID-19, trace and quarantine contacts, and monitor disease trends over time, most African countries implemented interventions to strengthen their existing disease surveillance systems. This research describes the strengths, weaknesses and lessons learnt from the COVID-19 surveillance strategies implemented in four African countries to inform the enhancement of surveillance systems for future epidemics on the continent. Methods The four countries namely the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda, were selected based on their variability in COVID-19 response and representation of Francophone and Anglophone countries. A mixed-methods observational study was conducted including desk review and key informant interviews, to document best practices, gaps, and innovations in surveillance at the national, sub-national, health facilities, and community levels, and these learnings were synthesized across the countries. Results Surveillance approaches across countries included - case investigation, contact tracing, community-based, laboratory-based sentinel, serological, telephone hotlines, and genomic sequencing surveillance. As the COVID-19 pandemic progressed, the health systems moved from aggressive testing and contact tracing to detect virus and triage individual contacts into quarantine and confirmed cases, isolation and clinical care. Surveillance, including case definitions, changed from contact tracing of all contacts of confirmed cases to only symptomatic contacts and travelers. All countries reported inadequate staffing, staff capacity gaps and lack of full integration of data sources. All four countries under study improved data management and surveillance capacity by training health workers and increasing resources for laboratories, but the disease burden was under-detected. Decentralizing surveillance to enable swifter implementation of targeted public health measures at the subnational level was a challenge. There were also gaps in genomic and postmortem surveillance including community level sero-prevalence studies, as well as digital technologies to provide more timely and accurate surveillance data. Conclusion All the four countries demonstrated a prompt public health surveillance response and adopted similar approaches to surveillance with some adaptations as the pandemic progresses. There is need for investments to enhance surveillance approaches and systems including decentralizing surveillance to the subnational and community levels, strengthening capabilities for genomic surveillance and use of digital technologies, among others. Investing in health worker capacity, ensuring data quality and availability and improving ability to transmit surveillance data between and across multiple levels of the health care system is also critical. Countries need to take immediate action in strengthening their surveillance systems to better prepare for the next major disease outbreak and pandemic.

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