Detect Pilot Spoofing Attack for Intelligent Reflecting Surface Assisted Systems

Abstract

Pilot spoofing attack (PSA) is a kind of active eavesdropping, which launches the identical training sequence to manipulate the channel estimation outcome during the pilot training phase. The newly proposed intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) system is vulnerable to the PSA because it relies on the pilot-assisted channel estimation methods to obtain channel statement information (CSI). To combat PSA in IRS-assisted systems, we consider two significant challenges: 1) channel distribution information (CDI) is uncertain, which will make the PSA detection methods based on the statistic feature (SF) invalid; 2) the noise is uncertain when detecting PSA in practical scenarios, which would impair the popular energy-based detectors. In this paper, we design a three-step training (TST) scheme. The effective detector could achieve reliable detection performance by examining the transmitter's received signal power levels when PSA occurs. The proposed method does not require the prior knowledge of noise variance and could obtain the CSI of both legitimate and illegitimate dyadic backscatter channels. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulations are presented further to demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed TST scheme.

Keywords

• Physical layer security
• intelligent reflecting surface
• pilot spoofing attack
• noise uncertainty