Remarks on the Philosophical Reflection of Fate in the Writings of Seneca

Abstract

The assertion of strict determinism was considered as to be a crucial part of the Stoic doctrine. Most other philosophical schools of the ancient world ridiculed or attacked it, whereas the Stoics consistently defended it. Nonetheless Seneca, the most eminent Roman Stoic, never presented a systematic description of what he thought fatum to be. The article offers a selection of the philosopher’s most important remarks about fate in a number of single works (Naturales Quaestiones, De providentia, De vita beata, Consolatio ad Helviam, Epistulae morales, Epigrams, Tragedies) placing them in the respective line of argument and considering their scope. It can be shown that behind these selective remarks there exists a highly consistent doctrine of fatum in perfect accordance with the Stoic mainstream. However, Seneca does not deal anywhere with the weak points of the concept, but introduces it almost everywhere as a self-evident basis for his reasoning. His primary interest lies in the psychological problems with acceptance of fatum and in the practical handling of its apparent lack of transparency and predictability.

Keywords

• Seneca
• Stoicism
• Fate
• Necessity
• Free will