Audit Fees for Initial and Subsequent Engagements: Evidence from Firms Listed in Tehran Stock Exchange

Abstract

Legislators, regulators, and the media have expressed concerns about pricing of initial and subsequent audit engagement and their implications for auditor independence and audit quality. The main concern is about the issue of “low-balling” in the initial audit engagement and its adverse effects on auditor independence and audit quality. This study examines the relationship between initial and subsequent audit engagement and audit fees. Using a sample of 931 firm-year observations from companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange during 1379-1388 and multiple regression models, we found the audit fees for initial audit engagement are higher than the subsequent audit engagement. We also found that there is no significant relationship between audit fees and subsequent audit engagement. Totally, the results do not confirm the issue of low-balling.

Keywords

• initial audit engagement
• audit fees
• low-balling
• auditor tenure