Principles and dilemmas of disinformation (deception) on selected historical examples

Abstract

The study presented here attempts to draw a synoptical comparison of the modern principles of operational camouflage through military deception. The research problem adopted encompasses the practical employment of disinformation and deception in an appropriate and inappropriate manner. The first part of the article contains an attempt to briefly present the current theoretical assumptions related to operational deception, including disinformation. The second part is dedicated to an arbitrarily selected examples from the history of the 20th-century warfare. The third part comprises conclusions and references of the theoretical assumptions to selected examples of armed struggle. The article contains two fundamental conclusions. The first one is the possibility of gaining an advantage at every operational level, especially at the tactical level, through employment of deception. The second one states that success is determined by a concept of operation which is recognizable by the opposing side, using the so-called Magruder’s principle and Jones’s dilemma.

Keywords

• operational deception
• disinformation
• Magruder’s principle
• Jones’s dilemma
• Operation Cockade
• the Falklands War