An optimal strategy to solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Abstract

Abstract Cooperation is a central mechanism for evolution. It consists of an individual paying a cost in order to benefit another individual. However, natural selection describes individuals as being selfish and in competition among themselves. Therefore explaining the origin of cooperation within the context of natural selection is a problem that has been puzzling researchers for a long time. In the paradigmatic case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), several schemes for the evolution of cooperation have been proposed. Here we introduce an extension of the Replicator Equation (RE), called the Optimal Replicator Equation (ORE), motivated by the fact that evolution acts not only at the level of individuals of a population, but also among competing populations, and we show that this new model for natural selection directly leads to a simple and natural rule for the emergence of cooperation in the most basic version of the PD. Contrary to common belief, our results reveal that cooperation can emerge among selfish individuals because of selfishness itself: if the final reward for being part of a society is sufficiently appealing, players spontaneously decide to cooperate.