Challenges and opportunities on the horizon of post-quantum cryptography

Abstract

Large quantum computers have the potential to break many cryptographic systems, e.g., Rivest–Shamir–Adleman, Diffie–Hellman key exchange, and the elliptical curve cryptosystem. The Department of Defense (DoD) is aware of this threat, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology is preparing a set of approved encryption and signature schemes that are not susceptible to these attacks by quantum computers, the so-called Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). The task of substituting older encryption and signature schemes raises a number of questions, to which there are not yet clear answers. In this research, we investigate the transition to PQC on existing networks, explain the approved PQC schemes, describe the likely path to an adaptation of PQC, and offer forward guidance on challenges and threats that may be encountered in the process of transition to PQC. This paper discusses the impacts of the new PQC schemes on network performance and speculates on possible side-channel attacks on the new encryption scheme. This paper offers hardware/software solutions based on the Split-protocol.